



**Director of  
Central  
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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Thursday  
22 October 1981***

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


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
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POLAND: Government Resolve

*The regime is intent on making clear its determination to rein in anti-Soviet activity.*

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Polish media reported yesterday that public gatherings in the southwestern province of Wroclaw had been banned following the distribution of "anti-Soviet propaganda" there. At least three Solidarity activists were detained, and Solidarity threatened a strike if they were not released; Wroclaw transit workers may have already begun a strike action on their own.

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It is unclear how the ban--the first to be imposed since the founding of Solidarity last year--is to be enforced. It could serve as a partial test of martial law plans long in preparation, and it will surely provide a gauge of popular sentiment.

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The show of government resolve may be intended partly to prompt Solidarity leaders--who are meeting today in Gdansk--to make some effort to control anti-Soviet agitators. Solidarity leader Walesa has previously criticized such activity as harmful to the union's interests, but he will be reluctant to comment until he is sure that the government is not using the "anti-Soviet" charge to mask a crackdown on local union informational activities.

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FRANCE-USSR: Gas Pipeline Project

*The French Government's decision to reexamine a contract associated with the proposed Soviet natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe could further strain relations.*

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A French refusal to approve the deal, however, would not be a major obstacle to completing the pipeline project, because several other West European and Japanese firms have actively bid on the contract.

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The USSR nevertheless will be displeased by the delay. The Soviets appreciated the more forthcoming attitude of the Giscard government,

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The Soviets have grown increasingly disturbed about the policies of President Mitterrand's government. Late last week, for example, an authoritative two-part article by *Pravda's* editor in chief criticized France's conduct of relations with the USSR and other major elements of French foreign policy, particularly its stand on TNF. The article was timed to coincide with Mitterrand's visit to the US.

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CYPRUS: Tougher Greek Position

*The election of Greek Socialist Andreas Papandreou almost certainly signals a hardening of the Greek and Greek Cypriot positions on the Cyprus issue and diminishes the prospects for a UN settlement.*

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Cypriot President Kyprianou and Papandreou will meet in Athens today to coordinate policy on Cyprus. Papandreou advocates a unified and independent Cyprus. In addition, he supports complete demilitarization of the island, a demand aimed at removal of Turkish troops and the dismantling of the British bases.

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Papandreou also will support a more militant Greek Cypriot bargaining stance. He favors linking the negotiations to the whole range of Greek-Turkish bilateral Aegean issues.

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Greek Cypriots hailed Papandreou's victory, but the Turkish Cypriot reaction was cautious and restrained.

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Papandreou's approach will jeopardize the intercommunal talks and hinder UN efforts for a Cyprus settlement. The UN plan calls for rotating the presidency between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a special development fund for northern Cyprus, and a territorial settlement giving 70 percent to the Greeks and 30 percent to the Turks.

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The plan is tentatively scheduled for presentation when the intercommunal talks resume on 27 October. Disagreements within the UN Secretariat itself over substance and strategy and negative reactions by Kyprianou do not auger well for its prospects. If the UN initiative fails, the Greek Cypriots are likely to place the Cyprus problem once again before the UN General Assembly, where they traditionally have gained strong international sympathy.

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OPEC: Possible Price Agreement

Venezuela may announce its support for the new Saudi benchmark price for crude oil at the Cancun summit, where President Herrera can present it as Venezuela's contribution to Third World development. Venezuelan Energy Minister Berti is publicly indicating his approval of a new benchmark price of \$34 per barrel for OPEC crude oil, although Caracas has not yet officially endorsed it. The loss of revenue resulting from a cut in the price of light crude, which accounts for less than 20 percent of Venezuela's oil exports, would easily be offset by raising the prices of medium and heavy crudes, which are underpriced in relation to the \$34 benchmark. At its meeting next week in Geneva, OPEC will seek agreement on the new benchmark; a price freeze through 1982 may be part of the package.

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NORTH YEMEN - USSR: President Salih's Visit

President Salih apparently will visit Moscow within the next few days to discuss debt rescheduling and probably increased military assistance. Salih repeatedly has threatened to make the trip,

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Although the Soviets want to strengthen their influence in Sanaa, they may not make any major new commitments to deliver weapons

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TURKEY: Constituent Assembly Convenes

The Constituent Assembly, which starts work tomorrow, is composed of political unknowns, a quarter of them named by the ruling National Security Council and the rest selected by it from lists provided by provincial leaders. Although many in Western Europe may recognize that the assembly is a first step toward the restoration of civilian rule, the exclusion of former politicians, the undemocratic selection process, and the abolition of political parties are likely to cause continued criticism in Western Europe. The generals probably will not be diverted from their course, although they may try to placate their critics by making concessions on some peripheral political issues.

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